The exclusionary rule of illegally-obtained evidence - an Anglo-Saxon perspective by Filletti, Stefano
The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally-Obtained Evidence -
An Anglo-Saxon Perspective 
Stefano Filletti, BA, LLD, LLM, (/ML/), MJur. (Oxon). 
Introduction 
Cicero's famous words Omnes Legum servi sumus ut liberi
esse possimus have stood the test of time. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau however writes that Man is born free but every­
where he is in chains, implying that man is constrained both 
by legal and social forces. This paradox is reflected in the 
balance between criminal substantive and procedural law on 
the one hand and the rights of the citizen, including human 
rights, on the other. The latter can indeed only be enforced and 
ensured by a derogation therefrom in certain circumstances. 
The right to liberty, for instance, can only be ensured by re­
stricting the liberty of others, whether in ordinary behaviour 
or as a punishment for previous conduct. 
This paradoxical situation is also reflected in rules gov­
erning illegally obtained evidence. Should the accused be con­
victed on the grounds of evidence obtained illegally, against 
his rights� or should his rights be given precedence, exclud­
ing the evidence, and in so doing detract from the protection 
of the rights of others in general? 
The examples drawn from various jurisdictions vary great­
ly owing to historical, social and political reasons. 
Discretion to Exclude. Improper I Illegal Evidence 
- A Comparative Analysis
Under English law, the general rule is that all relevant evi­
dence is admissible and the fact that it was obtained improp­
erly is immaterial as far as the case before the court is con­
cerned. These improper methods of obtaining evidence might 
trigger off remedial action. 
Reasons for Arrest 
In Mapp v. Ohio 1 the US Supreme Court held that an auto­
matically exclusionary rule applied to evidence acquired in 
(1961) US Supreme Court. 
384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602 (1966). 
breach of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution 
concerned with the right of the citizen not to be subjected 
to an unlawful search or seizure. With the advent of Miranda
v. Ariwna,2 a further requirement was added, namely that in­
vestigating officers were required to inform the suspect of
certain rights which he enjoyed and which they were to re­
spect scrupulously. Even though today, case law has watered
down this principle, a prima-facie reading is striking in that
the rule is far more stringent than that applied in English com­
mon law.3 It is interesting to point out that Miranda was in­
spired by the inadequacy of common law to deal with the
predicament of the suspect interrogated in the coercive envi­
ronment of police stations - a headache for any criminal court.
It was concerned with the psychological pressures which
might be placed on the accused and the fact that custodial
interrogation placed a heavy toll on individual liberty and
traded on weaknesses of individuals. The Court therefore es­
tablished a new exclusionary rule, the principle feature of
which was that the police would be required, before ques­
tioning the suspect, to inform him of his rights of silence and
right to have a lawyer's advice. This, it held, followed from
the privilege against self-incrimination granted in the Fourth
Amendment.
This is a convincing argument but how does it adhere 
with the English model? Lord Diplock in Sang4 indeed up­
held the nemo debet principle. The caution is also a must for 
the police officer under the Codes of Practice. The Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act5 ('PACE') however, introduced the 
possibility of drawing inferences from silence, such that the 
form of the caution had to be altered. Can it be said that this 
does not violate the right to compelled non-self incrimina­
tion? It is argued that the inferences which are permitted are 
those which are reasonable and dictated by common sense. In 
Murray v. UK,6 it was held that the right to silence and privi­
lege against self-incrimination protected one from 'improper 
Also Statute law - which now is deemed to import the same discretionary rights as available under common law. 
4 
[1980] AC 402, [1979] 2All ER 1222, 3; WLR 263. 
5 
1984. 
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(1996) 22 EHRR 29. 
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compulsion' not from the drawing of inferences. However, in 
effect, this provision is compelling the accused to speak to 
prove his innocence. Although it is reasonable and logical it 
cannot however be argued, in the writer's view, that it is not 
a form of permissible self-incrimination justified by the cir­
cumstances and bolstered by the need to protect society at 
large. This consideration has forced States, on the Continent 
to reject such inferences as they are deemed to violate their 
constitutional provisions on human rights. 
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
It is an established principle under English law dating as far 
back as in Warickshall,7 that evidence obtained from other­
wise inadmissible evidence, for example forced confession, 
was admissible. The rule governing evidence so obtained is 
different. However the US adopted the doctrine of the 'fruit of 
the poisonous tree'. Consequently evidence deriving from 
original evidence declared inadmissible as it was obtained by 
a breach of a constitutional right, is equally inadmissible. 
The element of causation is implicit in the doctrine, in that the 
'derivative' must result from the original piece of evidence. 
It is only where the taint becomes so attenuated that it is not 
properly considered as still operative, (but merely as a back­
ground material) that the doctrine is inapplicable. A genuine 
exception is the inevitable discovery rule. 
Disparity Between Jurisdictions 
Why is there such disparity between laws? US law considered 
breaches of the Fourth Amendment of their Constitution to be 
very grave. It is the supreme law of the land and anything 
tainted with such violation is inadmissible - implying the 
maximfraus omnia corrumpit. The question being why is it
allowed in England? If real evidence is discovered only by 
virtue of such tainted evidence, oral or otherwise, surely, that 
real evidence has a taint of illegality ( although it can speak 
for itself once discovered) and this because were it not for the 
illegally obtained evidence, that subsequent real evidence 
would not have been discovered. Further, breaches of human 
rights, are not violations of the supreme law of the land as 
held in US or Canadian case- law. In such jurisdictions human 
rights laws are given a higher status than ordinary legislation 
such that anything inconsistent with such law is void. Further 
in the US it is entrenched in the Constitution, and the same US 
adopts the principle of constitutional supremacy. In England 
human rights are only judicially acknowledged. It was in 1998 
that a Human Rights Act was drawn up in England and it is 
R. v. Warickshall (1793) 1 Leach 263.
not clear whether such Act enjoys superior status. Is it to be 
read in conjunction with - as a means of interpretation - or 
as binding rules rendering void inconsistent provisions? Par­
liamentary Sovereignty and Supremacy in England mean that 
all the statutes are given force by the fact that they emanate 
from Parliament. It may be argued that the Human Rights Act 
being a lex specialis and a lex posteriori, has precedence over
earlier statutes. But this is hardly a proper way of ensuring 
human rights, especially with the latter argument, in respect 
of subsequently enacted legislation. 
The application of the European Convention of Human 
Rights in fact has had an interpretative function so far. In R. 
v. Home Secretary exp. BriruI' it was held that if a statute
has more than one interpretation, the Courts will presume that
Parliament intended it to legislate in conformity with the
Convention. And not in conflict with it. But there is no hi­
erarchy. It is a tool of interpretation in cases of ambiguity.
In Scotland, Lawrie v. Muir9 established the rule requiring
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence unless the unlaw­
fulness or irregularity could properly be excused. Chalmers10 
then held that 
statements by a suspect in answer to police questioning were 
not admissible as evidence, at any rate if given in a police sta­
tion, a venue which is a sinister one in the eyes of every or­
dinary citizen. 
The Scottish police were therefore subject to a sui generis 
rule denying them the power in law to question suspects in 
custody. This is more restrictive than Miranda and English
obligations by far. Although this rule has been watered down 
by subsequent cases, it remains a strong proposition. 
A Discretion 
Corroboration and Supporting Evidence 
An interesting aspect is the requirement of supporting cor­
roborating evidence in the case of improperly obtained ev­
idence to render it more reliable, in the light of the court's 
discretion, to exclude prejudicial evidence in the case of sec­
tion 82(3) of PACE. The Court here would exercise its dis­
cretion to determine whether it is more probable than prej­
udicial and determine whether exclusion is the best option. 
Scottish law imposes a general requirement of corroboration 
in respect of all evidence, and consequently an accused can­
not be convicted solely on the basis of his own confession, 
however freely or voluntarily made. 
7 
8 
9 
[1991] 1 AC 696; [1991] 2 WLR 588; [1991] 1 All ER 720, HL(E).
1950 JC 19, 1950 SLT 37.
10 Chalmers v. HM Advocate 1954 JC 66, 1954 SLT 177.
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Vulnerability of Suspects 
In English law discretion in section 78 of PACE can be used 
against evidence obtained improperly from vulnerable sus­
pects. These would include juveniles, the mentally handi­
capped and mentally disordered. Special rules apply both in 
PACE and the Code of Practice to ensure the propriety and 
reliability of evidence so obtained. 
Discretion in Cases of Improperly Obtained 
Evidence 
Reference again must be made to the conflict which arises 
within this context: 
1. The impropriety of acquitting A, who is guilty, on account
of the illegal conduct of B - Cardozo, J. in The People
v. Defoe11 - on the one hand;
and
2. view held in Olmstead V. the US12 - "I think it is a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the gov­
ernment should play an ignoble part" (Holmes J), on the
other.
a. Facts Discovered in Consequences of Inadmissible
Confessions
Reference is to be made to section 76(4), (5) and (6) of PACE 
1984. It is held that subsection (4) preserves the proposition 
in Warickshall, which after excluding the confession in that
its credit was doubtful, allowed the production of evidence 
discovered as a result of confession: 
this principle ... has no application whatsoever as to the ad­
mission or rejection of facts, whether the knowledge of them 
to be obtained in consequences of an extorted confession 
whether it arises from any other source; for a fact, if it exists 
at all, must exist invariably in the same manner whether the 
confession from which it derives be in other respects true of 
false. Facts thus obtained, however must be fully and satis­
factorily proved without calling in the aid of any part of the 
confession of any part of the confession from which they 
may have been derived. 
Therefore in the case of Voisin,13 the Criminal Law Reform
Commission in England held, as reflected in sub-paragraph 
(4), that although a confession is inadmissible, a statement 
whether oral or written may be tendered as evidence to prove 
that the accused writes or speaks or expresses himself in a 
particular way. This however needs qualification to my mind: 
it must be so only where the writing or manner of speaking 
11 
(1926), US. 
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is the same whatever the circumstances, so that, just as the 
case with real evidence it can speak for itself. Where the man­
ner of speech, for example a stammer which is inculpatory 
given the circumstances, is induced by mental/psychological 
coercion by the police, this might trigger the discretion of the 
judge under section 78(1) and 82(3), although it is doubtful 
whether it would be excluded under s.76, it not being a state­
ment of any sort. 
Another argument of interest is that confessions obtained 
unfairly but which fall out of the exclusionary rule of s.76, will 
be corroborated by the fact that the evidence mentioned in 
the confession was in fact found as per the confession. There­
fore in determining whether or not to exclude evidence, the 
judge will take into account the fact that the confession was 
more probably reliable than not as it is corroborated by the 
fact that the evidence was found. A problem with this is where 
the confession is excluded on the basis of unfairness, not 
cogency - and this notwithstanding evidence obtained from 
that very confession is allowed. In this situation, section 78 
provides little safeguard for unfairness in trial. 
Further, what if the police are questioned as to the manner 
in which evidence was found? Can they refer to the statements 
made by the accused? Warickshall allowed this as the con­
fession was less indicative of the accused's guilt. No provi­
sion was made in PACE. This is a grey area of the law. 
b. Evidence Procured by Improper Means
Modem law stems from Kuruma v. R.14 where the accused
was charged with being in possession of ammunition after 
a search by an officer lower in rank than that permitted by 
law. It was held that the evidence was relevant no matter how 
it was obtained; although the judge could exclude the evidence 
on the basis of his common-law discretion (preserved by 
PACE in s.78(1) and 82(3)). 
Sang subsequently restricted the discretion, making it ap­
plicable to evidence obtained from the accused after the com­
mission of an offence. Trickery meant that the accused's will 
was engaged such that he was induced to give up evidence 
contrary to the privilege against self-incrimination. Howev­
er the discretion to exclude on the grounds of unfairness re­
mained. 
Exclusion for Unfairness 
In Kuruma it was held that English law recognized a judicial
discretion to exclude both confessional and non-confession­
al evidence for unfairness, even though after Sang, the wholi:
aspect of fairness with which that discretion was concerned 
12 
277 US 438, 72 L Ed 944, 48 S Ct 564. 
13 
R. v. Voisin [1918] IKB 531, 13 Cr App Rep 89, 82 JP96, 87 LJKB 574, [1918-1919] All ER Rep 491.
14 
Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v. R. [1955] AC 197, [1955] 1 All ER 236, [1955] 2WLR 223.
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was the one encapsulated in the maxim nemo debet prodere 
se ipsum. 
In Scotland, Muir upheld the rule requiring exclusion of
unlawfully / irregularly obtained non-confessional evidence 
which is not excused, imposing a reverse onus exclusionary 
rule burdening the prosecution to prove that it is fair and ought 
not to be excluded. Exceptions to the rule have been devel­
oped (similar to those in Bunning v. Cross 1 \ 
In Ireland, a constitutional breach brings about a reverse 
onus rule (similar to that in Scotland); while in the case of 
otherwise unlawful action, there exists a discretion to exclude 
evidence. 
In Australia, Ireland16 departed from English common law
by laying emphasis on unlawfulness of police conduct, rather 
than unfairness. In Bunning v. Cross, Barwick J again made
unfairness no less than unlawfulness central for the exercise 
of the discretion. The High Court had held that the unlawful 
conduct had resulted from a mistake not a deliberate breach. 
For this reason the nature of the illegality did not effect the 
cogency of the evidence which determines its admissibility. 
Subsequently in Ridgeway v. R.17 it was held that the discre­
tion applied only where the evidence was obtained improp­
erly / unlawfully or where obtained in consequence of im­
proper/ unlawful conduct. Further the discretion extends to 
cases involving official conduct that is not unlawful but 
merely improper. The Justices saw this as a means of recon­
ciling the references in Ireland to unfairness with the pre­
dominance given to unlawfulness in Bunning v. Cross. Ire­
land, indeed fuses together public policy and fairness issues.
There was considerable support for the view that Bunning 
v. Cross applies to mere improprieties. The Justices wanted to
confine narrowly the idea of impropriety short of unlawful­
ness. In the English case of Williams v. DP P, 18 where the po­
lice left an open unattended van full of cigarettes, the Court
allowed the evidence even though the conduct was improp­
er under Ridgeway. It was held that the accused was not ha­
rassed although possibly 'manipulated'.
In Canada, the issue is governed by section 24(2) of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ruling for exclusion where 
15 (1978) 19 ALR 641 at 660;141 CLR 54, at 74. 
16 
R. v. Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321.
17 
(1995) 184 CLR 19.
the evidence brings the administration of justice in disrepute. 
In Therens 1 9 Le Dain J, held that this principle of autono­
my for trial judge seems to be regarded as consistent with the 
idea that section 24 imports a rule of exclusion (however the 
judge has a discretion to determine whether or not the evi­
dence brings the administration of justice in disrepute and 
consequently within the letter of section24(2)). 
Forms of Improprieties 
1. Improper Searches
The English view was stated in R. v. Leatham20 as
it matters not how you get it if you steal it even, it would be 
admissible in evidence. 
This was followed in Kuruma and Khan,21 even though the im­
propriety envisaged trespass and violation of privacy. There is a 
wide range of cases dealing with the admissibility of samples of 
urine and breath even though obtained by impropriety. It will be 
difficult for the court to exclude real evidence on the basis of sec­
tion 78, as was shown in R. v. Fox,22 R. v. Apicella23 (intimate
samples), Cooke24 (non-intimate samples), Hughe? (forcible
intrusion with breathing), Nathaniez26 (deliberate breach of
promise). It was therefore not smprising that a breach of diplo­
matic immunity would not suffice to exclude evidence.27
2. Preparation of Illegal Acts
Sometimes impropriety arises in inducing or participating in 
the commission of the crime charged. In Sang the main issue
was whether there existed a defence of entrapment in English 
law. The House of Lords held that there is no such defence28 
and that it followed that there is no discretion to exclude evi­
dence of the commission of a crime on the ground that the 
defendant was trapped into committing it. To allow such a dis­
cretion would be to admit the defence by an alternative route. 
The House distinguished between trickery to cause an offence 
to be committed and trickery to obtain evidence of an offence 
after its commission. The latter, but not the former might, in 
some circumstances, be a ground for the exclusion of evi­
dence in the exercise of judicial discretion. 
18 
(1993] 3 All ER 365, (1994] RTR 61, 98 Cr App Rep 209, [1993] Crim LR 775.
19 
(1985] 1 SCR 613, 18 DLR (4th) 655.
20 (1861) 25 JP468, (1861-73] App ER Rep Ext 1646.
21 
[1997] Crim LR 584, CA. 
22 [ 1986] Crim LR 69.
23 (1986] Crim LR 238, CA.
24 
[1995] 1 Cr App Rep 286, CA. 
25 (1994] 1 WLR 876, 99 Cr App Rep 160.
26 (1995] 2 Cr App R 565.
27 
R. v. Khan (1996] 3 All ER 289.
28 R. v. Mealey (1974) 60 Cr App ReP 59.
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Although in the meantime section 78 of PACE was en­
acted, this preserved the common law discretion. However 
in Edwards29 the court seemed to be confused. Undercover
officers approached D, offered and subsequently agreed to 
buy from him a quantity of prohibited drugs. D and E were 
charged with conspiracy to supply persons unknown. The 
defence argument was the converse of Sang - that the evi­
dence should be excluded under section 78 because the offi­
cers were agents provocateurs . It was held that D and E were
not agents provocateurs of the offence charged- a conspir­
acy existing before D and E's approach to supply any suitable 
customers who might present themselves - and therefore the 
question of section 78 did not arise. The opinion of the Court 
seemed to be that there was no discretion unless the officers 
were agent provocateurs - standing Lord Diplock's state­
ment of the law in Sang on its head. There would apparently,
in the court's view have been a discretion if the charge had 
been conspiracy to supply the officers because they incited 
D and E to make the particular agreement - a particular con­
spiracy to supply any suitable customers who presented them­
selves. It is not easy to see that there is any difference in fair­
ness or unfairness according to which conspiracy is charged. 
In either case the defendants had been induced to incriminate 
themselves by a trick. 
Later cases seemed to ignore Edwards, as was shown in
Smurthwaite and Gill ,30 D was charged with soliciting O to
murder D's spouse. 0 was a police officer, who was intro­
duced to D by a third party and pretended to be a contract 
killer. It was held that evidence of the subsequent solicita­
tion of Oby D to commit murder was admissible. 0 was not 
an agent provocateur because there was no evidence that D
had been persuaded or cajoled into an agreement to murder 
he would not otherwise have entered. The fact that O was not 
an agent provocateur seems to have been a factor in favour
of admission. In those cases it seems clear that D must have 
had the particular crime in mind before O came on the scene. 
This is not true of Williams and Another v. DP/'3 1 - the
court said that the police were not agents provocateurs be­
cause they had not incited, procured or counselled the com­
mission of the crime. Yet surely they procured its commis­
sion. They intended to bring about, and brought about, the
commission of a crime which would not otherwise have been
committed. If no one had attempted to steal the cartons, they
would have regarded the enterprise as a failure. The defendants
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may perhaps have had a general disposition to commit the 
crime, but it is impossible to say that they intended to com­
mit this particular crime until the temptation was deliberately 
put in their way. In Smurthwaite, the trap was set for a par­
ticular person who was believed to have in mind the com­
mission of a particular crime. In Williams, the bait was there
for any dishonest opportunist who happened to come along. 
These may be necessary to keep crime in check. 
Valuable guidance as to the application of section 78 was 
given in Christou.32 First of all the court stated that the discre­
tion under section 78 and common law were the same. Fur­
ther, the argument that the evidence obtained should have 
been excluded under Sang was rejected. In so deciding the 
Court took account of the following: 
1. the whole interview was recorded on tape and film, so
there was no doubt about what was said (no reliance on
memory);
ii. the question about resale was necessary to maintain cover;
iii. 'the trick was not applied to the appellants; they volun­
tarily applied themselves to the trick';
iv. if the shop had not attracted the defendants, they would
have sold the property to someone else;
v. unlike some cases where evidence was excluded, the
defendants were not in custody;
vi. because the parties were on equal terms, PACE, Code C,
governing the questioning of persons by police officers,
was not applicable.
In Bryce33 evidence was excluded because the conversa­
tion was not recorded and challenged and the question was 
not necessary to maintain cover. 
Discretion and Staying of Proceedings 
In the Australian case of Ridgeway v. R .,34 it was held that en­
trapment is not a substantive defence to a criminal charge. 
The law recognizes a discretion to exclude, on public policy 
grounds, evidence of an offence or of an element of an offence, 
in circumstances where its commission has been brought 
about by unlawful conduct on the part of law enforcement. 
This can extend to circumstances where a criminal offence 
has been induced by improper, though unlawful, conduct on 
the part of the authorities. The appropriate remedy in an en­
trapment case is not a stay of proceedings on the ground 
that the proceedings are an abuse of process. If a stay is ul­
timately granted, it will be because the exclusion of the 
29 
R. v. Edwards [1991] Crim LR 45.
30 R. v. Smurthwaite [1994] 1 All ER 898; R v. Gill [1994] 1 All ER 898.
31 
[1993] 3 All ER 365.
32 
[1992] 4 ALL ER 599. 
33 
[1992]4ALLER567.
34 
(1995)184 CLR 19. 
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charged offence or of an element of it, means that the pro­
ceedings will necessarily fail with the consequence that a 
continuance of them would be oppressive and vexatious. 
In the English case of R. v. Latif and Shahzad,35 it was
held that where a defendant had been trapped by the decep­
tion of the police or customs officers into committing an of­
fence which he would not otherwise have committed, the trial 
judge had to weigh in the balance the public interest in en­
suring that those who were charged with grave crimes should 
be tried, and the competing public interest in not giving the 
impression that the court would adopt the approach that the 
end justified any means when exercising his discretion to 
decide whether there had been an abuse of process which 
amounted to an affront to the public conscience and required 
the criminal proceedings to be stayed. On the facts, the judge 
had not erred in refusing a stay, since he had taken account 
of the relevant considerations in performing the balancing ex­
ercise and was entitled to take the view that the accused was 
an organizer in the heroin trade who had taken the initiative 
in proposing the importation, and that the conduct of the cus­
toms officer was not so unworthy or shameful that it was an 
affront to the public conscience to allow the prosecution to 
proceed. 
c. Improper Interception/Recording of Communica-
tions
Evidence of communication encouraged by the police and 
then intercepted was not automatically inadmissible as such 
at common-law. False statement that the accused was not 
being recorded or that the phone from which he was told to 
phone from was bugged, are irrelevant. In Maqsud Ali36 
(1996), it was irrelevant that there was a recording device in 
a public place. Only in the case of telephone calls made from 
police premises is there a provision in the Code of Practice 
for warning the suspect that the call may be overheard. 
Interception of phone calls, declared by the European 
Court of Human Rights to require guarantees against abuse, 
was subjected to the statutory control of the UK Interception 
of Communications Act 1985. Under section 2 the Home 
Secretary may issue a warrant authorizing the interception 
of communications in the course of transmission by post or 
by means of a public telecommunications system, for the pur­
pose, inter alia 'of preventing or detecting serious crime'. 
These do not extend to the prosecution of offenders. (Pres-
35 [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 270; R. v. Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 353. 
36 R. v. Masqud Ali [ 1965] 2 All ER 464.
37 R. v. Preston [1993] 4 All ER 638.
38 R. v. Effik [1995] 1 AC 309.
39 
R. v. Mason [1987] 3 All ER 481.
40 [1988] 3 All ER 683.
41 
R. v. Stagg Central Criminal Court, 14 September, 1994.
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These intercepted communications are inadmissible,
notwithstanding their relevance to the issues in a criminal 
trial. 
Where a cordless telephone is used, the radio signals as­
signed between the handset and the base unit are not in the 
course of transmission by means of a public telecommunica­
tions system. The interception of this does not require war­
rant and is not unlawful under the 1985 Act. (Effik).38 The
same applies to a private system which is connected by wire 
to the public system. 
In Khan, the police attached an aural surveillance device 
to B's home without his consent or knowledge and so ob­
tained a recording of a conversation which confirmed that 
K was involved in the importation of drugs. The attachment 
of the device was an unlawful act, involving civil trespass and 
criminal damage. Yet the evidence was admissible in law. 
Although not conclusive, it is taken in consideration, in 
exercising discretion in section 78, that the interception took 
place overseas, in breach of foreign or international law, 
since breach of such law should not be more weighty in the 
English Courts than a breach of English law. Where a tele­
phone call is recorded by one of the parties to secure evi­
dence, then one of the considerations relating to the opera­
tion of section 78 is the extent to which this method has 
been employed to evade the restrictions of the Code of 
Practice on Police Questioning. 
3 Deception 
This category is designed to generate evidence of offences 
which had already been committed, otherwise than by im­
proper searches or the use of electronic interception of com­
munications. Deception can either be express, as in Mason39 
where the police lied to the accused and his solicitor by telling 
them that the suspects fingerprints where found on the scene 
of the crime. They could be implied as in DPP v. Marshall,40 
where policemen dressed as civilians and did not say they were 
policemen. The Court in this case held that the impact was not 
like that of express deception. Complex stratagems such as 
Christou would also fall under this head. It was considered 
in that case that there were no specific targets. 
Where the undercover agent plays too active a role in elic­
iting the evidence it is more likely to be excluded.41
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Conclusion 
The experience derived from different jurisdictions is var­
ied. Reconciling the needs of the administration of justice with 
the rights of citizens is by no means an easy task. The oblig­
ation of police officers to investigate, detect and prosecute 
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crimes must be limited to ensure that the means used by po­
lice officers will not themselves spark off or induce further 
crime. Nor should their duty in any way justify violations of 
citizens' rights to ensure convictions at all costs. Justice ought 
to be done but not at any cost. Respect for the rule of law is 
essential in any just and equitable society. 
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